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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REFORM THE DEED IN
/\CCORDANCE WITH TIIE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES.
Respondent asserts that appellants have not established
by "clear and convincing evidence" that the parties were
mutually mistaken in the execution and delivery of an instrument at variance with their intent, nor that appellants have
not been guilty of neglect in the execution of che deed, citing
the standard set forth in Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222
P. 2d 571, 581 (1950).

(Respondent's Brief, p. 11)

The Sine

v. Harper standard was later interpreted and refined by this
Court, as stated in App2liants' Brief at pp. 15-16, in Naisbitt
v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P. 2d 620 (1957), as follows:
All that is required is that evidence exists whereby
this court can say that the trial judge acted as a
reasonable man in finding that the proof of the fact
asserted is greater than a mere preponderance.
6
Utah 2d at 122, 307 P. 2d at 624.
Conversely, appellants' burden of "clear and convincing evidence"
to support reformation of this deed is to demonstrate that
proof of the facts supporting reformation is greater than a
"mc•r1'

pr(~ponc1cr. 1 nc<---",

and t_h.-it the: trial court acted unreason-

ably in refusing to fairly consider such proof.
Respondent first asserts that the erroneous deed description is merely a "latent
'

reformation.
hy ·,1,, ftinq
i

ambigui~y"

which does not require

Yet the trial court already reformed the deed
the (kc'd rlescripLinn n0rthwa.rd so as to border

he c"dqe of u. s. Highway 6 on the south, and, in turn, by

··11, 'Vl 11qSponsored
the bynorth
line
northerly
equal
distance·
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitizationan
provided
by the Institute
of Museum and LibraryBy
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

referring to Exhibit "21", reproduced as Appendix "l" in
respondent's brief, it is readily apparent that the rectangular parcel found by the court, bordering along the edge of
the highway, crosses over and embraces substantial land lying
north and west of the railroad tracks and right-of-way of
the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad!

Such property was never

and coulc..; never have been used by appellants and their predecessors in interest for partnership and, later, corporate
purposes, ahd bears no resemblance whatsoever to the property
actually intended to be conveyed, and subsequently occupied
and used by appellants and their predecessors in interest
•

for over twenty (20) years.
Clearly, therefore, the parties were mutually

mistaken~

to the description of the property intended to be conveyed.
In evaluating a claim for reformation of a deed, the controlli
concern is ~he intention of the parties at the time of coowr
ance.

Scott v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 303, 422 P. 2d 525 (1966);

23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds

§

159 (1965).

Thus, where, by respond-

ent's representations, even though made after the fact,
to appellants and their predecessors in interest, it is shown
that respondent intended to convey all the property within
the yellow lines depicted on Exhibit "21", and that appellant'
relied on those representations in their acquisition and
subsequent use and occupation of that property, then such
intent requires that the deed be reformed to conform thereto.
Respondent asserts that there is no evidence in Llw re·:·
·
·
that Skyline Enterprises,
Inc., rather t h an respon'1cnr 1iir·."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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allowed full occupation and use of the disputed property.
Apparently, respondent has not examined the record carefully.
His own expert realtor witness, Esbern Baadsgaard, testified
that the entire property in question was used by appellant
Gerald Carter and his predecessors in interest, clear back
to 1954 when operated by Skyline Enterprises, Inc.
197, lines 12-28)

(Tr., p.

This fact was confirmed by each of the

appellants and by their predecessors in interest:

Mr. D. Lloyd

Horlacher (Tr., pp. 220, 226-27), Mrs. Elda Horlacher (Tr.,
pp. 258, 259, 260, 261), Dr. Merrill L. Oldroyd (Tr., p.
240), Mr. John A. Canto (Tr., pp. 279, 280), and Mr. Gerald
Carter (Tr., pp. 294, 295, 297, 298, 316-317).

Even Dennis

Prince, one of the original partners in the Skyline Enterprises
business, paid rent to appellant Gerald Carter for camping
space in the disputed area (Tr., p. 299), recognizing Carter's
right, as successor in interest of the business property, to
occupy the disputed area.
Respondent further asserts that he did not make the
boundary representations claimed by appellants.

Yet he care-

fully avoids mentioning the fact that in his pleadings, under
his Third

and Fourth Defenses in his Reply to Defendants'

Counterclaim, he specifically admitted making the aforesaid
representations, as follows:
THIRD DEFENSE
As a separate and affirmative defense, plaintiff
alleges that any statement or communication made
by him relative to any land claimed by the defendants within Section 14, Township 10 South, Range
6 East, Salt Lake Meridian, was true and correct.
(Emphasis added.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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FOURTH DEFENSE
As c;t ~eparate and further affirmative defense;
plain~if f alleges that any statement or commuriit~
tion made by him relative to any land claimed by
defendants within Section 14, Township 10 Southi
Range 6 East, Salt Lake Meridian was made in g~b~
faith and was made with probable ~ ~oelJ.e ;i.ng
~uth of any statement or communication mad~.
(Emphasis added.)
-Respondent is bound by these express admissions lh hill
pleadings, and is es topped from denying that such :tepteserilations were made.

Months later, at time of trial,

ent to sudaenly change his mind and decide that

fdt: re~pond·

he dld

not

make such fepresentations after all, in no way affedl~ ttta
binding adiliissions previously made in his own pleadihgs.
These admissions by respondent, coupled with

the

testirnon>

about the representations made by him to Mr. Horiacihei' (tr., p:
207, 215), Mrs. Horlacher (Tr., pp. 260-261), Dr. dltlrbyd

(Tr., pp. 238-239), and Gerald Carter (Tr., pp.

30tl-304) t con·

elusively ~stablish the reality of the representatiohs, t~
reliance of the parties thereon, and the intention of the
parties in contracting with respect to the property.

In com·

paring this overwhelming weight of the evidence to respondent'
lame attemt>t to deny what he had already admitted in his
pleadings, the trial court clearly erred in not firtdirtg clear ,
and convincing evidence to support reformation of the deed.

In~tead,

the trial court sustained objections tb testi·

many about those representations on the ground that, cit
time of sale, respondent did not own the land.

(Tr. , P ·

th~
2081
1

There appears to be no legal authority for the proposition
only a landowner can make competent representations with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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respect to boundary lines of property, nor that such representations can be made by a granter only to his immediate
grantee, and respondent cites none in his brief.

Respondent

was a previous owner of the property at the time he made
the representations, and was, at the time, the owner of
the contiguous tract, and he admitted in his own pleadings
the truth and accuracy of the representations made.
The trial court did allow similar testimony to subsequently come in, but with tongue in cheek, and was obviously
still of the same opinion expressed in its prior ruling.
(Tr., pp. 214, 237, 261)

The court was clearly influenced by

its earlier ruling, and persisted in its reasoning expressed
therein.

By its obvious refusal to fairly consider this

clearly competent evidence in its judgment, the court committed
reversible error.
In swn, the testimony of appellants clearly preponderates andthere is no credible evidence to sustain the decision of the trial court supporting the respondent's

'

position in this case.

Appellants are fully aware of their

responsibility to establish error made by the trial court,
and respectfully submit that the refusal by the trial court
to fairly consider the great preponderance of testimony
concerning respondent's representations, and its adherence to
a false premise, unsupported by legal authority, so colored
the court's decision as to amount to prejudicial and
reversible error.
Respondent also asserts that appellants and their predSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ecessors ih interest were "inexcusably negligenth wilh res~~
to the erroneous deed description.

Yet respondent himself

accepted the faulty description both as granter and as one
of the grahtees in the original deed to the partnership in
1954.

None of the parties involved ever used and occupied

the land across the highway on the south or across the railro'
tracks on the north and west which was purported to be conve1,
by that ertoneous description.

Rather, appellants ahd their

predecessots in interest relied upon the representations
made to thl:!l:n by respondent concerning the actual bdundaries
of the property, and used and occupied the land up tb thos~
boundaries•

They, as lay grantees, were

~

given any

reason to doubt the accuracy of the deeded description, parti:
larly wherE! no survey hau ever established whether the metes
and bounds tlesoription conformed to the physical boundary
lines actually occupied and claimed by them.
Inexctisable neglect is a question to be deterntinE!d by
Geo~

the facts and circumstances of each individual case.
v. Fritsch Loan

&

Trust Co., 69 Utah 460; 256 P. 400 (1921);

Peterson v.• Eldredge, 122 Utah 96, 246 P. 2d 886 (1952); ~'
Annot.

I

Bl A.L.R. 2d 7 I 31-33 (1962).

The trial

court

made

no such fittding, and there certainly was no prejudice to
the respondent, where he himself, as grantee, accepted the
faulty description prepared by himself as granter.

H any

negligence was present, it was attributable to respondent.
Where he clearly intended, as evidenced by the representatlor'
he admittedly made, to convey all the property bounded with:'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the yellow lines depicted on Exhibit "21", and appellants and
their predecessors in interest, in reliance thereon, subsequently used and occupied the entire disputed area, the deed
should be reformed to conform to the intention of the parties.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND A BOUNDARY LI:;
ESTABPSHED BY ACQUIESCENCE ALONG THE NATURAL ANb MAN-.
MADE BOUNDARIES OF THE PROPERTY.
Respondent asserts that appellants have failed td estai.
lish the presumption that a binding boundary line by acquiescence existed between the parties.

On the contrary 1 appel·

lants have clearly shown, by the great weight of i:he evid~nc:
in this case, that such a boundary by acquiescence

exist~,

and have firmly established that boundary on all four
required pbints:
First, with respect to a visible line,

the foregoing

discussion under Point I, supra.- is pertinent to this issue.
Despite respondent's claim that no such evidence is

~res~t

therein, the record clearly establishes that ever since
May 22, 1954, when respondent conveyed the property to hi~
self and others as partners doing business under the name ani
style of Skyline Enterprises, he and his colleagues as gtaW
and appellants as their successors in interest, for a period
of more than twenty (20)

consecutive years, have occupied,

claimed, ahd operated the entire property up to the physical
11

boundaries delineated by the yellow lines on Exhibit

21"·

This fact is conclusively demonstrated by the testimony of
·
(T r ·
Mr. Baadsgaard, respondent's own expert witness
Mr. Horlacher

1

p • 191:

(Tr., pp. 220, 226-27), Mrs. Horlacher (Tr.,

pp. 258, 259, 260, 261), D;r:. Oldroyd (Tr., p.

240), appellant

John A. Cahto (Tr., pp. 279, 280), and appellant Gerald cart•
(Tr., pp.

294,

29'>, 2'>7,

298, 299,

316-317).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The boundaries of the property, as represented by respondent to Mr. and Mrs. Horlacher, Dr. Oldroyd, and Mr. Carter,
and expressly admitted by respondent in his pleadings, as
outlined under Point

~,

supra, correspond to the physical

contours of the land, the "visihle line" following the natural
and man-made boundaries of the property:

i.e., the Denver

and Rio Grande Railroad right-of-way on the north, an existing
fence line adjacent to Tie-Fork Creek on the east, U.S. Highway 6 on the south, and the west boundary of a pond on .the
west.

This area, clearly delineated by visible natural and

man-made monuments, fences, etc., was the area actually
occupied and used by appellants and their predecessors in
interest, including the plaintiff, through the partnership
and corporation in which he was an owner, rather than the
actual deeded description, a large portion of which includes
the highway, or the parcel adjusted to border on the edge
of the highway, a large portion of which then crosses over
the railroad tracks themselves.

Such a parcel bears no

resemblance to the property actually used and claimed by
appellants and their predecessors in interest.
Respondent alleges that the fence along Tie-Fork Creek
was used for livestock control.

Respondent, however, since

the original conveyance to the partnership, Skyline Enterprises, on May 22, 1954, has always maintained and represented
the fence as being the boundary line between the parties.
(Tr., pp. 207, 215, 238-39, 260-61,, 300-304)

As such, the

~~se comes squarely within the rule set forth by this Court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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in Baum v. Defa, 525 P. 2d 725 (Utah 1974), as follows:
... On the other hand, if the property on either side
of such a fence is conveyed to separate parties, so
that there comes into being separate ownership of
the tracts on either side, and the circumstances
are such that the parties should reasonably be
asswrt~d to accept the fence as the boundary between
their properties, then from that time on, the time
durirl9 which the fence continues to exist, should
be regarded as going toward fulfilling the time
requirement for the establishment of a boundary by
acquiescence . . . • 525 P. 2d at 727.
Respdndent asserts that he did not acquiesce irt the
as a boundary.

I

1~

Respondent, however, overlooks the represent!

tions he admittedly made, discussed previously under Point 1,
supra.

Furthermore, he never objected to the occupation and

control of the disputed property by appellants and their
predecessors in interest.

(Tr., pp. 220, 305)

Hie asked

permission of appellant Gerald Carter to spray weeds on t~
property.

(Tr., pp. 303-304)

After his conveyance to app~l·

lants' pred~cessors in interest, respondent moved his small
family cabin from the disputed area, across Tie-Fdtk Creek,

l~r,

onto respondent's own property which he still retained.

•

pp. 131, 132; 298)

When he saw appellant John A. Cahto gradi'.:

and leveling the disputed area, respondent never objected to
Canto performing the work, but merely waved as he passed bY·
(Tr., pp. 271-74)

Finally, when appellants' possession sur·

vey indicatl3d that the boundary of the property might extend
east of Tie-Fork Creek, respondent told appellant Gerald
Carter that he had

~lwAys

undrrstnod the rAst boundaty

of~

property to be Tie-Fork Creek, and advised Mr. Carter to
go to a stationery store across the street from the lltRh
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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C''

'

Courthouse, and get some quit-claim deeds, and respondent
would straighten out the description.

(Tr., pp. 301-302)

Respondent further alleges that acquiescence in the
boundary line has not been shown for the requisite number of
years.

The "long period of time" is generally equated with

the prescriptive period of twenty (20) years.

Nevertheless,

as this Court declared in Baum v. Defa, supra, " .•• [T]his
may depend upon the circumstances of the individual case."
525 P. 2d at 727; see also, King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135,
378 P. 2d 893 (1963), and Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 123,
239 P. 2d 205 (1951).

See generally, Annot., 69 A.L.R.

1430 (1930), supplemented in Annot., 113 A.L.R. 421 (1938).
In this case, at any rate, the acquiescence has actually
endured for more than twenty (20) years, since 1954, when
respondent, wearing two hats as both grantor in the original
deed and also as one of the grantees therein, in conjunction
with the partnership and corporation, exercised full control
over the entire property up to the boundary lines depicted
by the yellow lines on Exhibit "21".

Since 1963, when Dr.

Oldroyd became the sole owner of Skyview Enterprises, Inc.,
and then sold the property to the Horlachers, it has been
exclusively occupied and controlled by appellants and their
predecessors in interest, up to the commencement of this
proceeding.

All of the elements of a boundary by acquiescence,

including the requisite period of ti.me, have been fully met.
Respondent emphasizes that appellant Gerald Carter, once
he discovered the discrepancy between the erroneous deed deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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scription ahd the land he actually occupird and used,
to buy that land from respondent.

Mr. Carter, being unaware

of his legal claim thereto on the basis of boundary by
cence, made the gesture as an attempt to placate

(Tr.

I

ac~~

responde~,

testifying that he did so "as a matter of settling any
action ... n

att~~

1~~

p. 309)

Respondent further asserts that he used the property
by parking in the disputed area and holding one family reunic
there.

(Tr., p.

318)

Appellant Gerald Carter, after an

acquaintance with the property for over twenty

(~)

years,

testified that he had never observed a well or any evidence
thereof on the property.

(Tr., p.

318)

Respondent himself,

contrary to his representations in Respondent's Brief 1 pp.
and 22, testified that he never participated in planting
grass on the property (Tr., p. 149, line 16 et ~-), such
planting and re-seeding actually having been performed by
the Horlachers

(Tr., pp. 220-21, 297, 298) and Gerald Carter

(Tr., pp. 304-305).
Other than the courtesy shown to an acquaintance and
former landowner in allowing respondent to park on the proper:i
one time, the other alleged uses

(~, granting a pole-lihc

easement and excepting the property in another, separate cleed,
'

by respondent are mitigated by the erroneous deed descriptior
created by respondent himself as grantor in the original deec,
and in any event are irrelevant in light of the represcn~tions which he admittedly made concerning the boundary

1 inv,

This also applies to such assertions as the moving of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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·

toilets, which were moved to allow access for grading (Tr.,
p. 313), and not because of any act on respondent's part.
In the final analysis, the intention of the parties is
the controlling consideration in determining boundaries.
v. Jones, 120 Utah 385, 235 P. 2d 132 (1951).

Losee

The overwhelm-

ing weight of credible evidence, demonstrated by respondent's
representations and the parties' subsequent acts in reliance
thereon, clearly establish all the elements of a boundary by
acquiescence along the natural and man-made boundary lines
of the property, represented by the.yellow lines on Exhibit

"21".

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT III
THE TkIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING MONEY DAMAGES TO
RESPONDENT.
Respondent asserts, in support of his award of money
damages, that there was no "significant" rebuttal testimony
on the matter.

His derogatory appellation of Mr.

John A.

Canto, a professional earth mover and land leveler, as a
"cat-skinner"

(Respondent's Brief, p. 23), together

~ith ~

denigration of Mr. Canto's testimony, again indicate his fa!:
ure to carefully examine the record.

Appellants have no nee'

to resort to name-calling in order to show that there was,
indeed, "significant" rebuttal testimony on this issue.
Mr. D. Lloyd Horlacher, one of appellants' p:teciecessot~
in interest, testified that, when he came into possessionof
the property, there was a "big field of wild thorn bushes"
which he was obliged to grade and clear off the property.
(Tr., pp. 217, 218)

In addition to the thorn bushes; the

disputed area was also covered and "overgrown with weeds".
(Tr., p. 221)
Appellant John A. Canto, who has been in the eatth-movi''
business for twenty-five years (Tr., p. 276), testified that
the topsoil in the disputed area was of very poor quaiity
(Tr., p. 276), and that there was no difference ih the soil
condition after he performed the grading work.

(Tr., P· 271!

He also testified that little if any dirt was pushed into
Tie-rork Creek, and that the grading was performed in

a~·

~direction, rather than easterly into Tie-Fork Creek.
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pp. 274, 277-78, 284)

No one, other than the man who personally

performed the grading work, was in a better position to authoritatively describe how the work was done -- especially not
an occasional visitor, Grant Williams, whose testimony must
be viewed in the light of his obvious bias as respondent's
own brother.
Respondent alleges that the admission of his unsupported
and self-serving testimony constituted harmless error.

To

the contrary, the testimony was properly objected to, and its
admission constitutes reversible error on the part of the trial
court.
In Provo River Water Users' Ass'n. v. Carlson, 103 Utah
93, 133 P. 2d 777 (1943), the Court did say that an owner
of property is always entitled to testify as to its value,
and to express an opinion as to its value (in condemnation
proceedings).

However, in Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Steele

Ranch, 533 P. 2d 888 (Utah 1975), the Court limited that holding by ruling that such testimony is incompetent unless it
appears that the owner has a realistic idea of its value.
This Court definitively set forth its stand on the issue
in Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Johnson, 550 P. 2d 216 (Utah 1976),
as follows:
The case of State v. Larson [54 Wash. 2d 86, 338
P. 2d 135 (1959)] shows the trend of recent decisions
and we think it correctly sets forth the law:
An owner of property may testify as to its
value, ... upon the asswuption that he is
particularly familiar with it and, because
of his ownership, knows of the uses for which
it is particularly adaptable • . . . However,
when, as here, the owner has not used his
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intimate experience with and knowledge of
the land's uses as a basis for determining
its fair market value, but has obviously
determined it upon tne application of an
improper formula, his opinion fails to meet
the test and, therefore, has no probative
value.

•

Another case in point is that of Commonwealth 1 etc.
v. Hopson I396 S.W. 2d 805 (Ky. 1965)] which holds:
The landowner should not be permitted to
testify as to market values unless he qualifies in accordance with the holding in
Commonwealth v. Fister I373 S.W. 2d 720
(Ky. 1963)].
~hat case held:
"The net effect of odr
decision on this question is that the owner
bf real estate shall not be presumed adequately qualified to express an opinion of
market values by reason of ownership alone."
Another case of interest on the point is that of
Rot~e v. Murphy Il98 s.w. 2d 932 (Texas Court of
civil Appeals 1946)], wherein the court stated:
Appellant next complains because she was
hot permitted to testify to the market
value of the lots in question. Appellant
did not show herself to be sufficiently
familiar with the cash market value of
these lots to qualify her to express an
opinion as to their value, and therefore
the court did not err in excluding her
testimony as to the value of the lots.
550 p, 2d at 217-218.
Appellants respectfully submit that, just as in the cu~
cited by the Court in Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Johnson, ~·
there was never any showing that respondent in this case h~
any expertise whatsoever with respect to property values or
other surrounding circumstances, and therefore, he was not
competent to testify by reason of previous ownership alone.

~n the Johnson case, supra, the owner testified as to what
the property was worth to him personally, and this Court
held the admission of such testimony to be reversible er~t
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The basis upon which the owner stated the value of
the property was not permitted by law. What the
property is worth to a seller is not a correct
basis for an opinion [citing United States v. Petty
Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946)], and the motion
to strike the answer should have been granted.
550 P. 2d at 217.
In the present case, as in Johnson, supra, the only evidence
upon which the court awarded damages was respondent's flat
assertion as to what the property was worth to him.

On the

basis of Johnson, supra, such award constitutes reversible
error.

See, Burke v. Thomas, 313 P. 2d 1082 (Okla. 1957).

Respondent asserts that the property is suitable for potential summer homes on half-acre lots (Tr., pp. 104-105}, and
his expert witness, Mr. Baadsgaard, also made his estimate of
value upon the same erroneous assumption.

Such use is based

upon a legal impossibility.
The business property is currently zoned by Utah County
as T & S-1, Trade and Services.

The surrounding area, due to

watershed considerations, is currently zoned CE-1, Critical
Environmental.

The current uses of the property, ~, motel,

service station, restaurant, and trailer parking, are all
specifically permitted by the T & S-1 zoning designation.
Utah County, Utah Rev. Zoning Ordinance, as amended, § 4-5-8
( B)

and ( C)

( 19 7 6) .

On the other hand, summer homes are not permitted under
CE-1 zoning.

Id., § 4-5-5 (B) and (C).

Even if a variance

wer0 qranted to change the zoning to CE-2, Critical Environ-

inr~nt zoning which does permit seasonal homes, the miniJTl1.lll)
lot size requirement thereunder is twenty (~) ~, an
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area more than twice the size of the entire property in qttestion.

Id.; § 4-5-6

(C) and (DJ; § 4-6-4 (F)

(4).

In Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538
P. 2d 301 (Utah 1975), the defendant builders promised to
locate plaintiff's home in compliance "with all zoning 0 ~~
nancesand regulations and all building restrictions and
protective covenants governing said real property."

This

Court found that the performance bargained for (i.e., a home
with a view of the valley) was legally impossible under
existing zoning law, and held:
[Al designer who undertakes to situate proposed
cohstruction at a particular site, pursuant to
hi~ plot plan, is required to do so in compliance
with applicable zoning ordinances and restrictive
covenants.
538 P. 2d at 308-09.
There is not one shred of evidence in the record to
demonstrate that respondent took any of the petition-andamendment steps required to obtain a zone change under
§

_!i:.1

4-1-7, other than "discussing the possibilities of re-

zoning with a local official".
Tr., p. 132i

(Respondent's Brief, P• 26;

Such action does not constitute a fortna:l peti-

tion for variance, which could not have been granted anyway,
under current zoning law, and therefore any use of the prope:
other than those expressly permitted within the zone;

is

expressly prohibited under § 4-1-11, Utah County, Utah Rev.
Zoning Ordinance, supra.
p. 2d l340

(Utah 1974).

See, Morgan County v. Stephens,)!
Appellants respectfully submit,

therefore, th~t the award of damages by the trial court,
based on respondent's testimony of what the property wa~ ~·
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to him (i.e., for summer homes), was erroneous on this additional ground, and that the "highest and best use" upon which
the award was partly predicated is not permitted by law and
is therefore invalid.
Respondent alleges that he has not sought to take

~dvan

tage of the substantial improvements made on the proper.j by
appellants and their predecessors in interest.

Yet, at the

same time, he claims trespass by appellants and their predecessors in interest on the disputed area.

If that were true,

then such supposed trespass dates back to 1963, when the
first came on the property, and graded and removed

~orlachers

the thorn patch and weeds which infested the area.
217, 218, 221)
Damages

§

(Tr., pp.

This principle is explained in 22 Am. Jur. 2d

133 (1965), as follows:

"Notice, though, that it

is the present value of the land in its condition innnediately
prior to the tort which is important.

The court will not

require the defendant to pay damages based upon a value which
assumes that the land had been changed (for example, from
wild to cultivated land) to the most profitable use".

'

(Empha-

sis added.)
Respondent thus appears to want to "have his cake and
eat it, too".

He seeks to expropriate the improvements

made on the property and enjoy their benefit, and then seek
damages for the condition of the property immediately before
and ~fter the grading in 1974, some ten years after the
ini tia,l improvements were made.

";cf the act of the defendant

is a benefit to the land and increases its value, the plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tiff cannot enjoy the benefit and at the same time

recov~

the cost of restoring the land to its former condition."
22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 133 (1965); see also, 22 Arn. Jur. i
Damages§ 204 (1965).
R.esporl.dent makes much of the estimate of replacement

co;

which was ignored by the trial court, and for which he cik
no Utah authority.

It should be noted that Mr. Johnson's

estimate was based on figures supplied by respondent, he
(Mr. Johnson) never having personally been on the land (Tr.,
pp. 59, 61), and that topsoil was probably availabie

int~

immediate Vicinity of the property, thus avoiding the length:
and costly 98 trips alleged by respondent.

(Tr., pp. 59-60)

The testimony of the respondent's brother, Grant Williams,
was not oniy biased by his relationship, but was

addr~ssed

to the claim that forage for livestock was impaired by the
grading, and it had nothing to do with its effect on the
use of said land for summer homes.
Thus, the before-and-after test was correctly, alth~~
erroneously, applied by the trial court.
1 A.L.R. 3d 801 (1965).

See generall_y, Ahne

However, if such a test is applicabi

it should date back to the original alleged trespass, at t~
time of the thorn patch, rather than at some later date,
after respondent has taken advantage of the improvements made
by appellants and their predecessors in interest on the proP'
erty.

R.espbndent's discussion of punitive damages is ir~W

Vant, havin9 been ignored by the trial court, and merits
further discussion.
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iin

CONCLUSION
Appellants respectfully request that the relief sought
on appeal, set forth in detail in appellants' principal
brief on file herein, be granted in full, and that the
decision and judgment of the trial court be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
V. PERSHING NELSON
ALDRICH & NELSON
43 East 200 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Appellants
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